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Abstract 
Modern construction projects are developing towards large-scale, complex and integrated. The management of 
construction projects needs support of new organization systems. Based the latest results in the field of project 
management and the theory of manufacturing visual organization, using the game theory, we set up analysis model 
for moral hazard of construction project visual organization under various situations, obtain contract conditions to 
prevent moral hazard by solving the model, and prevent moral hazard by controlling contract condition parameters. 
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1.Introduction
The construction project visual organization is the dynamic union formed by the enterprises 
participating in the project in order to achieve their own specific interest and common goals, by 
integrating ability and resource, contributing their core competence, and taking corresponding right and 
responsibility. It is a function union formed by the enterprises participating the project bases on the 
project function, and has self-organization, goal, sensitivity, dependence and mobility, and is used to 
achieve flexible and low-cost operation of the project. 
Current study of construction project hazard mainly concentrates on period, cost and quality. Based on 
the theory of construction project life cycle and risk correlation analysis, Ren[1] measured and ordered 
project cost risk. More literature studied the period risk of construction projects using Monte Carlo 
simulation method and random network analytic computation method[2,3]. Xu[4]defined pattern of visual 
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construction as designˇbuild˄D+B˅patternˈbut did not solve the organization risk problem of visual 
construction at a deep level. 
The study of moral hazard originates from the study of insurance market. Moral hazard comes from 
uncertainty of the honesty of the insured people, and is thought of as an extra payment among the 
insurance compensation. While the study of moral hazard gets deeper, using the entrusting party-agent 
theory Holmstrom[5] defined the moral hazard as the problem of forcing the agent to provide suitable fund, 
information and labor etc. for the product, when the entrusting party can not observe the agent’s behavior 
directly and such providing is not arranged directly in the contract. 
Participants of the construction project, especially the agent, might have low moral behavior while 
participating in the project, because of the speculation of the agent, non-symmetric information between 
the entrusting party and the agent, and non-effectiveness of the supervision and punish mechanism. There 
is not much study of the moral hazard for construction project visual organization in the literature. In this 
article, using the game theory, we give hypotheses for various cases invoking moral hazard for 
construction project visual organization, set up analysis model for such moral hazard, obtain contract 
conditions to prevent moral hazard by solving the model, prevent moral hazard by controlling contract 
condition parameters, and provide useful reference for the successful collaboration between parties of the 
construction project visual organization. 
2. Moral hazard prevention model in operation of construction project visual organization 
For the moral hazard of the construction project participants caused by non-symmetric information and 
non-effectiveness of supervision and punishment, in order to prevent low moral behavior, based on the 
game model of the three parties of entrusting party, supervision party, and agent in the case of non-
symmetric information[6]ˈin the case the entrusting party can not supervise the agent because of lack of 
the time or knowledge, we introduce supervision system—operation management center of construction 
project (OMCCP)[7,8] as part of the organization system to supervise and assess the behavior of the 
agentˈand help the entrusting party to control low moral behavior of the agent via integrated information 
management. 
2.1. Parameter hypotheses and setting up the model 
1.Denote by x the profit created by the work of the agent when the entrusting party  consigns the 
project to the agent. Then x is determined by the production rate parameter T of the agent and the effort 
level function e. Suppose that x=T+e, where e is a variable which can not be observed directly by the 
supervision system and the entrusting party. Also, one can use the currency function g(e) to represent the 
effort of the agent. Here g is a strictly increasing convex function and g(e) = g'(e) = 0 . 
2.Denote the wage of the agent(the cost of the entrusting party) by W. Since W is a differentiable and 
strictly concave increasing functionˈthe utility function U exists. Suppose that there exists some w 
satisfying                         . Then the expectation utility of the agent is EU[ W g(e)]Ȃ . 
3.If the reservation wage of the agent to collaborate on the same projects with other entrusting parties 
without effort cost is W0ˈand the corresponding utility function is                   ˈthen the condition for 
the agent to sign contract with the entrusting party is ( ( ))EU W g e U t . 
4.Denote by S the wage of supervision for the supervision system, by V the utility function, by EV(S) 
the expectation utility, and by S0 the reservation wage. Then only when                  and ( )EV S Vt ˈthe 
supervision system will supervise the behavior of the agent. 
5.Suppose that there are two different production rate values    andT representing the low production 
rate status and the high production rate status respectivelyˈand                  . Set                   . Before the 
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agent chooses effort level, the production rate level is T, which may or may not be observed by the 
supervision system. Denote the supervision system and the entrusting party by S and A respectively. Then 
there are four possible statuses as following: 
Status 1˖both S and A can observe    ; Status 2˖A observed   ˈS has no observation; 3˖A 
observed T ˈS has no observation˗Status 4˖both S and A can observeT .Denote the probability of 
these four statuses by    . Then            . If the given production rate level is Tˈthen the signal set observed 
by the supervision system is s=̗TˈI̙ˈwhere I means that the supervision system does not observer 
any information. But the agent has information advantageˈthus we may assume that the agent knows the 
true status of what the supervision system finds out about the production rate. 
6.Suppose that the contract specifies in detail the salaries S and W of the supervision party and the 
agentˈthe wage is determined by the profit x and the information value r which the supervision system 
reports to the entrusting agent. Suppose that the supervision value of the supervision system on the agent 
can be verified. Because the supervision system has representative from the entrusting partyˈit will not 
act in collusion with the agent. Then one has the following possibilities about the supervision value r 
reported by the supervision system to the entrusting party˖ 
If s=Tˈthen r=̗TˈI̙. If s=Iˈthen r=I. If the entrusting party and the agent have signed contract, 
then the agent knows its own production rate level, the supervision system can observe the signal released 
by the agent, the agent will take certain effort level for the project, the supervision system will report the 
result of the agent to the entrusting party, and the entrusting party will reward the supervision system and 
the agent according to the report of the supervision system. 
2.2.The case of symmetric information 
For the purpose of comparison analysis, we consider the case that the value of the production rate can 
be observed by the entrusting party. Then the supervision party does not need to observe the value of the 
production rate, and hence there is no utility function of the supervision system. The wage of the 
supervision systems is the constant S0. Suppose that the entrusting party can also observe the effort level 
of the agent. Then the optimal effort value of the agent is the maximal value of the project profit 
subtracting the effort utility of the agentˈi.e.                             .  Then ˈ                                       , T ˈ
the marginal utility equals the marginal costˈ denoted by * *( )g g e{ ˈ the wage of the agent 
is                      . 
2.3.The case of non-symmetric information  
When the information is not symmetric, the information has the four statuses as above. We discuss 
first the optimal contract when there is no auxiliary contract (i.e. no union yet). Notice that, given S0ˈthe 
supervision system will get the reservation effect completelyˈand has no motivation to lie (i.e. to 
conceal the truth), and hence the entrusting party can obtain the report information from the supervision 
system at minimal cost. Then the three-level structure of entrusting party—supervision system—agent 
becomes a two-level structure entrusting party—agent. The entrusting party pays the total expense S0 to 
get the information from the supervision party. Thus we get the following CF (Coalition Free) model: 
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Here AIR (Agent’s Individual Rationality) is the agent’s individual rationality constrain condition; 
AIC (Agent’s Compatibility Constrain) is the agent’s incentive compatibility constrain condition. 
2.3.1. The case of no collusion between the supervision system and the agent 
From CF one concludes that, in the situation of no union, the optimal contract is the optimal one when 
the entrusting party has the information of the supervision system. In such situation, the wage of the 
supervision system is S0. Thus we conclude that W3>W1=W4>W2 and e1=e3=e4=e*>e2. From the 
Lagrange function we get 
 
 
One can see that when i z 2 the Lagrange function depends only on                and               . This means 
that when 2i z ,               gets the maximal value, i.e.                                  . Then the first-order conditions 
can be summarized as                                          
                    (1)   
 (2)  
                                                                                                                                                    (3) 
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            (5)  
                                                                                              
  If 0J  ˈthen the incentive constrain condition is invalidˈthe optimal solution exists. But the 
optimal solution is not incentive compatible for the agent. Thus, for the function gˈ J is a strictly convex 
increasing function, which means that           . One can find the utility level of the agent in these four 
statuses through the equations (1)-(4).  
The honesty of the supervision system means that the entrusting party has all the information in 
statuses 1 and 4 (assuming the value observed by the supervision system is true). In such a case the 
optimal effort level of the agent can be achieved. The optimal insurance means that the wage of the agent 
is the same in these two statuses. In statuses 2 and 3ˈthe entrusting party does not have the full 
information about the production rate level. Thus the wage in status 3 must be higher than that in status 2, 
in order to provide sufficient incentive to the agent to ensure that the agent will not stay away from the 
production rate in status 2 (i.e. not to encourage the agent to have low work efficiency) .Therefore, when 
the information is non-symmetric, and the supervision system has no collusion with the agent, the 
entrusting party must punish low efficiency and reward high efficiency stronglyˈand the optimal 
production rate also involves non-optimal low production rate. 
2.3.2. The case the supervision system conspires with the agent 
Suppose that after or while the entrusting party and the agent sign the main contract and before the 
uncertainty is settled, the agent and the supervision sign some implicit contract privately. Such a contract 
uses a trade function t(x,r) from the agent to the supervision party to represent the relation between the 
profit and the report value of the supervision system. The total revenue of the supervision party and the 
agent are̗S(x,r)+t(x,r)̙and̗W(x,r)-t(x,r)̙respectivelyˈwhere t is the function of the implicit trade. 
The implicit trade between the supervision system and the agent either can not be obtained by the 
entrusting party or is a bilateral agreement not prohibited by terms of the main contract.  The supervision 
party and the agent might sign an implicit contract to make the supervision party report a truly possible r 
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so that they can maximize their own wage benefits under any profit x and any status. In order to avoid 
such collusion, we must give some constrain, which I call˄C˅s.t.. These constrain conditions must be 
satisfied by the final distribution. Denote by                    all the distribution statuses ˄     and        include 
implicit transactions˅.Then the optimal contract for the entrusting party is not to have collusion between 
the agent and the supervision party. Thus we get the following C model:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here SIR is the supervision party’s rationality constrain condition, AIR is the agent’s individual 
rationality constrain condition, AIC is the incentive compatibility constrainˈCIC1ˈCIC2ˈCIC3 are 
combined incentive constrains. Here we omit two constrains: one is the rationality constrain condition in 
status 2, and the other is the union’s incentive constrain condition in status 2. 
These two constrains will be automatically satisfied when we solve the problem. Obviously, collusion 
between the supervision party and the agent will damage the interest of the entrusting party. Thus˄C˅
s.t. has more constrain conditions than˄CF˅s.t. does. 
In order to solve the above constrain equations, we use the following result. Theorem 1:(a) 
S4!S1!S2=S3; (b) W3-g(e3)!W4-g(e4)!W1-g(e1)!W2-g(e2); (c) S4+W4=S3+W3; (d) e1=e3=e4!e2. 
All the constrain conditions except CIC1 hold simultaneously. Here we introduced the supervision 
system’s rational constrain condition and the union’s incentive constrain condition. Later we shall check 
that the condition CIC1 can hold. 
From the Lagrange function we get: 
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                                                            (11) 
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If the agent’s incentive compatibility constrain holds, then 0J ! . We assume first 0J  . Then from 
the equations (7), (8), (11) and (12) we get: 
 
   (15) 
From the agent’s incentive compatibility condition one gets˖ 
 
   (16) 
The equations (15) and (16) imply                    S3!S2                                                                                                                        (17) 
By (16)(17)ˈthe inequality˄CIC3˅failsˈwhich implies 0S  . The equations (11) and (12) imply 
                                                                                                                                                         (18)  
This contradicts the inequality˄16˅, thus 0!J  . 
If˄CIC3˅holdsˈthen 0S ! . Suppose that 0S  . From the equations (7) and (8) we get S3<S2ˈ
which contradicts˄CIC3˅. Since in fact the agent’s individual rationality constrain condition˄AIC˅
holdsˈwe get 0S ! ˈS3=S2. From (6) and (7) one gets S1!S2. From (6) and (8) and reality one has 
S3=S2<S1ˈH S! . From (6) and (9) one obtains S1<S4. 
About the wage of the agent, from the equations (10), (11) and (13) one gets 
. Furthermore, from ˄CIC2˅one obtains W3+S3!W4+S4ˈand thus 
W3!W4. From the equation (14) one concludes either                or              . Now we check that˄CIC1˅ 
is satisfiedˈbecause S1!S2ˈ                                        . 
The entrusting party can not hope to have better solution under the condition Cˈbecause the constrain 
conditions C must be satisfied in final distribution. But if the entrusting party solves the conditions C and 
uses the solution to define contract, then one can not increase the value of the total wage by changing the 
report value or the effort level. Furthermore, by constructing such conditions, one can specify the optimal 
insurance plan of the supervision party and the entrusting party. Then the entrusting party and the agent 
will not have implicit contract, and the entrusting party can ensure its interest using solution of the 
conditions C. Once the union incentive constrain is introduced, the entrusting party can limit its 
compliance with the contract to make sure that the supervision party and the agent will not conspire. 
Therefore we get: 
When the supervision party and the agent conspire, the final distribution satisfies the conditions (a)-(d) 
in Theorem 1. Now we analyze the product in the presence of collusion. When the condition (d) of 
Theorem 1 is satisfied, there is one deceptive distortion, that is, the production rate is low but not 
observed by the supervision party˗the condition C follows from the condition˄CIC2˅when the effort 
level is the same under the statuses 3 and 4, thus the total wage is equal under the statuses 3 and 4. But, 
under these two statuses, no matter how high the risk is, the wage of the supervision party and the agent is 
completely different. Under the status 3ˈif the agent has low production rate and the supervision party 
does not observe it, then the agent must get high wage to be willing to carry out the project˗under the 
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statues 4ˈthe agent will get wage than that in status 3 in order to ensure that the agent will not bribe the 
supervision party to conceal the status of the production rate. 
Under the status 1 the union incentive compatibility constrain has no constrain power, because the 
report value of the supervision party is in low production rate status, and the supervision is worthless.    
This is natural, because under low production rate status, the agent is willing to find excuse to produce 
low profit. In such case we think that the constrain condition˄CIC1˅has no constrain power. 
Under the status 4, in order to lower the cost for the supervision party to reveal the agent’s high 
production rate, the entrusting party will lower the wage S3 of the supervision party, and will claim 
compensation from the supervision party, because the latter fails to observe any useful value in order to 
increase the profit. However, the supervision party can not have wage in status 3 lower than that in status 
2. Then we have S3=S2ˈand the constrain condition˄CIC3˅will force the wage to be the lower value 
S2.Therefore, we see why the supervision party has wage in status 1 higher than that in status 2, though in 
fact the supervision party is more willing to reveal low production status. 
Thus, main contracts determined using C can prevent collusion, as such contracts take into account 
possible collusion between the supervision party and the agent. If the entrusting party provides such a 
contract, then it is a balance for other participants who accept such a contract or not. This means that the 
entrusting party does not need to worry about collusion between the agent and the supervision party, 
because the supervision party and the agent do not have contract better than this one, and the 
corresponding union incentive compatibility constrain has no constrain power. 
3. Conclusions 
During the operation of construction project visual organizationˈthe project participants usually have 
non-symmetric information. Therefore, when the operation management center of construction project 
(OMCCP) has no collusion with the project agentˈthe entrusting party have to punish low production 
rate and reward high production rate stronglyˈso that under enough incentive (wage level under status 3) 
the agent will take high production rate T . 
Because of the possibility of moral hazard among the participants of the project, OMCCP might have 
collusion with the project agent. Thusˈthe solution is to use contraction condition C to prevent collusion 
between OMCCP and the project agent, when the construction project visual organization is form. 
References 
[1] H. Ren. Risk lifecycle and risk relationships on construction projects.International Journal of Project Management, 1994, 
12(2) p. 68-74. 
[2] S.E. Elmaghraby. On criticality and sensitivity in activity networks.European Journal of Operational Research, 2000, (127) p. 
220-238. 
[3] G. Li. Computer simulation and risk analysis of network planning. Journal of Hohai University, 2001, 29(1) p. 65-69. 
  [4] Y. Xu. Study on pattern of virtual construction.Shanghai: TongJi University, 2000. 
[5] B. Holmstrom. Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1982, 13(2) p. 324-340. 
[6] J. Tirole. Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations. Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organization. 1986, 2 (2) p.181-214. 
[7] T. Esselman, M. Eissa, W.M. Brine. Structural Condition Monitoring in A Life Cycle Management Program. Nuclear 
Engineering and Design, 1998, 181 (1-3) p.163-173. 
[8] W. Vanhaverbeke, N.G. Noorderhaven. Competition between Alliance Blocks: The Case of the RISC Microprocessor 
Technology. Organization Studies, 2001, 22 (1) p.1-30. 
